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Abstract
In order for small but complex systems like rovers, SmallSats, or Unmanned Aircraft (UAS)
to operate autonomously, they must have a real-time solution for assessing their own sys-
tem health. System ans Software Health Management (SHM) enables better detection of
faulty sensors and software problems, and enables better fault management including mit-
igation of unpredicted fault scenarios in the absence of a human on-board. In recent work,
we have developed a Responsive, Realizable, Unobtrusive Unit (R2U2) for on-board SHM
of autonomous UAS and demonstrated its ability to detect faults during flight time. These
faults, from sensor failures, to software problems, to malicious security attacks, can present
as transient temporal faults that even humans are challenged to find. An R2U2 config-
uration is a modular combination of multiple types of temporal logic runtime observers
with fault-specific Bayesian Nets and sensor filters. R2U2 reasons about both on-board
hardware and software components; R2U2 itself can be instantiated as an independent
FPGA-based configuration or as a software component running independently from other
software on-board.
Small satellites, such as CubeSats, also require on-board SHM and failure mitigation,
as limited telemetry bandwidth does not allow the transmission of the entire system state
for ground-based health management. However, the autonomous operation of satellites
brings a set of challenges different from UAS, including the effects of radiation on non-rad-
hard, low-cost components, and the harsher environment of space. We surmise that a new
extension of R2U2 could be adapted to help better detect, for example, radiation errors
in cheaper COTS (not rad-hard) components often used in small space systems. Since
small satellites often operate in coordination, we will also examine new ways of distributed
monitoring of their communication and cooperation and real-time detection of off-nominal
situations utilizing multiple satellites. This talk will discuss preliminary work and ideas for
building on terrestrial success of system and software health management for the harsher,
and differently challenging, environment of space.
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https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180008732 2019-08-31T16:43:50+00:00Z
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A Recent Motivation. . .
Crash of ESA’s ExoMars Schiaparelli Lander
October 19, 2016
parachute deployed at:
altitude of 7.5 miles (12 km)
speed of 1,1075 mph (1,730 km/h)
heat shield ejected at altitude of 4.85 miles (7.8 km)
IMU miscalculated saturation-maximum period (by 1 sec)
Navigation system calculated a negative altitude
premature release of parachute & backshell
firing of braking thrusters
activation of on-ground systems at 2 miles (3.7 km) altitude
Crash at 185 mph (300 km/h)
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Crash of ESA’s ExoMars Schiaparelli Lander
Runtime Sanity Checks
Relevant to this Mission:
The altitude cannot be negative.
The rate of change of descent
can’t be faster than gravity.
The δ altitude must be within nominal parameters; it cannot change
from 2 miles to a negative value in one time step.
The saturation-maximum has an a priori known temporal bound.
These sanity checks could have prevented the crash.
Capability of such observations is required for autonomy.
Laboratory for
Temporal Logic Kristin Yvonne Rozier R2U2: System Health Management for SmallSats
Motivation R2U2 Framework SHM in Space
Enabling Autonomy
What do the humans do?
1 Pilot the system (on-board or remotely)
Autopilot
2 Provide self-awareness
System Health Management
3 Respond to off-nominal conditions
Automated replanning and learning
4 Make tough judgment calls
Algorithms like TCAS beat humans
Ethical decisions are an open problem . . .
System Health Management (SHM) is required for autonomy.
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Runtime Monitoring
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Research: state-of-the-art
can check complex
temporal properties
very efficiently
low overhead
real-time
enables resets, exits from
infinite loops, etc.
requires instrumentation
to send state variables to
monitor
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Previous Approaches: Runtime Monitoring
report property failure
instrument software (or hardware)
alter the original timing behavior
utilize advanced resources
require a powerful computer
use powerful database systems
high overhead
unintuitive specification language
report only the outcomes of specifications
Laboratory for
Temporal Logic Kristin Yvonne Rozier R2U2: System Health Management for SmallSats
Motivation R2U2 Framework SHM in Space
Previous Approaches: Runtime Monitoring
report property failure
instrument software (or hardware)
alter the original timing behavior
utilize advanced resources
require a powerful computer
use powerful database systems
high overhead
unintuitive specification language
report only the outcomes of specifications
Laboratory for
Temporal Logic Kristin Yvonne Rozier R2U2: System Health Management for SmallSats
Motivation R2U2 Framework SHM in Space
Requirements
Realizability:
easy, expressive specification language
generic interface to connect to a wide variety of systems
adaptable to missions, mission stages, platforms
Responsiveness:
continuously monitor the system
detect deviations in real time
enable mitigation or rescue measures
Unobtrusiveness:
functionality: not change behavior
certifiability: avoid re-certification of flight software/hardware
timing: not interfere with timing guarantees
tolerances: obey size, weight, power, bandwidth constraints
cost: use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components
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Satisfying Requirements
Responsive
Realizable
Unobtrusive
Unit
R2U2
. . . So how do we do that?. . . So how do we do that . . . f r small satellites?
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R2U2: Runtime System Health Management1
1 TL Observers: Efficient temporal reasoning
1 Asynchronous: output 〈t, {0, 1}〉
2 Synchronous: output 〈t, {0, 1, ?}〉
Logics: MTL, pt-MTL, Mission-time LTL
Variables: Booleans (from system bus), sensor filter outputs
2 Bayes Nets: Efficient decision making
Variables: outputs of TL observers, sensor filters, Booleans
Output: most-likely status + probability
We plan to implement R2U2 in both hardware (FPGA) and software
1
T. Reinbacher, K. Y. Rozier, and J. Schumann. “Temporal-Logic Based Runtime Observer Pairs for System Health
Management of Real-Time Systems.” TACAS’14, pg 357–372.
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R2U2: Runtime System Health Management2
Health Nodes / Failure Modes
H FG magnetometer sensor
H FC RxUR Receiver underrun
H FC RxOVR Receiver overrun
H FG TxOVR Transmitter overrun in sensor
H FG TxErr Transmitter error in in sensor
H_FG
S4 S5
H_FG_TxErr
S2
H_FG_TxOVR
S1S3
H_FC_RxOVR
S6
H_FC_RxUR
We combine specifications in a way that is:
hierarchical/structured
compositional
cross-language
2
J. Geist, K.Y. Rozier, and J. Schumann. “Runtime Observer Pairs and Bayesian Network Reasoners On-board FPGAs:
Flight-Certifiable System Health Management for Embedded Systems.” RV’14.
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Runtime Functional Specification Patterns3
Rates
Ranges
Relationships
Control Sequences
Consistency Checks
Velocity
Velocity
?
We need to expand specification patterns to runtime!
3
K.Y.Rozier. “Specification: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal Methods and Autonomy.” VSTTE, 2016.
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Multi-Platform, Multi-Architecture Runtime Verification of
Autonomous Space Systems4
R2U2
R2U2
R2U2
4
2016 NASA Early Career Faculty Grant Number NNX16AR57G
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SHM is Different in Space vs Air
1 COTS 6= RAD-hard
run software and hardware versions in parallel
how to check the checkers?
monitors for health of the monitors?
2 Swarms enable external observations
rovers usually watched by satellites
CubeSats usually launched in swarms
UAS on other planets expected to work in groups
how to incorporate signals from external observers?
3 Resource constraints differ
power, CPU, memory, . . .
tiny telemetry bandwidth: on-board monitoring is essential
human validation is limited
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Open Questions
Specifications for SmallSats (vs UAS)?
Reasoning about environmental conditions/radiation?
Specification patterns?
Automating specification creation?
Integrating swarm observations?
Parallel hardware/software implementations
checking each other?
R2U2
Collaboration welcome!
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